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By Mark Stelzner2 and Daniel Taekmin Nam

Abstract: As a country, the United States spends significantly more on healthcare
than other advanced industrialized countries, and Americans have comparably
worse health outcomes. Both are developments of the last four decades. In this
paper, we present a macro, long term explanation of these adverse changes by
looking at the evolution of antitrust and patent laws in the United States,
surveying the literature on how change in concentration and patent laws have led
to increased prices, and constructing a counterfactual national health expenditure
series for 1980 through 2006. We find that the cumulative excess cost of private
healthcare spending on hospitals, physician groups, prescription drugs, and net
insurance from 1980 until 2006 is between $3 and $6 trillion.
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Introduction
As a country, the United States spends an incredible amount on healthcare. In 2017, total
healthcare spending amounted to more than seventeen percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
This represents both a high historically and relative to other advanced industrialized countries.
For example, France spent only 11.46 percent of GDP on healthcare in 2017; Germany spent
11.27 percent, and other developed countries spent even less. This dramatic difference in health
spending between the United States and other industrialized countries is a phenomenon of the
last forty years. In 1980, developed countries spent between 4.74 and 8.23 percent of GDP on
healthcare. While the United States represents the upper bound in this range, Germany spent the
same percentage of GDP on healthcare as the United States in 1980, and, in general as can be
seen by the more compact range, there was no dramatic difference in spending between
developed countries. However, since 1980, spending on healthcare in the United States has
rapidly increased – moving away from its developed counterparts. At present, there is an almost
nine-percentage point difference between spending on healthcare as a percentage of GDP in the
United States and the average for all other member countries of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and there is a five-percentage point difference between
the United States and the advanced industrialized country that spends the second most on
healthcare, France.
Despite spending vastly more on healthcare, many health outcomes in the United States
are significantly worse than those of other developed countries. For example, over the same
period that total spending on healthcare as a percentage of GDP has dramatically outpaced other
advanced industrialized countries, life expectancy at birth in the United States has lagged more
and more behind. At present, life expectancy at birth for Americans is 78.7 years – two years
less than Germany and more than five years less than Japan with other advanced industrialized
countries falling somewhere in between. Indeed, the United States ranks 28th among all 36
OECD countries in life expectancies at birth. Like with healthcare spending, these developments
are relatively new. In 1980, life expectancy at birth in the United States was comparable to other
OECD countries.3
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Data on total healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP and life expectancy at birth is taken from the OECD
database (https://data.oecd.org/).
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Thus, we must ask: why does the United States spend so much on healthcare as a
percentage of GDP compared to other countries while many health outcomes for Americans are
comparatively worse? Also, what has happened over the last four decades that has led to
dramatically increasing costs in the United States with comparatively worse outcomes? And,
finally, if the increase in cost is not coming from increase in quality, how much are Americans
overpaying for healthcare? Otherwise said, what is the economic rent – the income not
commiserate with marginal social benefit – accruing to some in the healthcare industry?
There is a rich and developed health economic literatures which looks at a range of
potential answers to these questions. For example, there is literature on asymmetric information
and its effect on prices. There is also an array of studies on increased market concentration in
hospitals, physician groups, and health insurance and the effect on price. In addition, some
health economists have looked at the changing organization of healthcare from preferred
provider organizations (PPOs) to health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and others have
studied the difference and interaction between public and private provision and payment of
healthcare. While this literature is incredibly informative, indeed we use it to construct our own
study, it is often very fragmented in terms of geography, time, and subsector of healthcare.
Thus, the macro, long term answer to the above posited questions is often unclear, and the
answer to the latter question on the overall rent in healthcare has still been left unanswered.
In this paper, we attempt to provide such a macro, long term answer. First, we integrate
developments in healthcare into larger changes in antitrust administration in the United States.
Second, we survey the literature on change in concentration in hospitals, physician groups, and
health insurance and show how these changes have led to increased prices. We also use the
literature to illustrate how parallel developments in patent laws have allowed pharmaceuticals to
increase the price of prescription drugs. Fourth, utilizing growth accounting, we project a trend
for what costs would have been from 1980 until 2006 if these changes in law had never taken
place. We find that the cumulative excess cost of private healthcare spending on hospitals,
physician groups, prescription drugs, and net insurance from 1980 until 2006 is between $3 and
$6 trillion. This value is on par with estimates by other economists on the excess cost of our
financial system over the same period and goes a good distance in explaining why Americans
pay so much for healthcare and achieve relatively less in terms of comparative health outcomes.
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Antitrust deregulation
Developments in antitrust administration have been important in remaking the rules of
the game faced by healthcare providers. As we will see in the following sections, these changes
have led to an increase in concentration and thus prices in hospitals, physician groups, and health
insurance which are central to understanding the increase in cost of healthcare over the last forty
years. To better comprehend these developments, we first take a step back and look at the
overall, non-healthcare specific, changes in administration of antitrust laws in the United States.
Antitrust law falls under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act,
the Clayton Antitrust Act, and the number of amendments to these laws. In terms of mergers and
acquisitions, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially
“lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”4 The very broad language of this law
gives the courts and antitrust authorities, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), significant room in deciding exactly what classifies
as a substantial reduction in competition.
In Table 1, we reproduce data on the DOJ’s definition of unconcentrated, moderately
concentrated, and highly concentrated markets. First published in 1968 and redefined in 1982
and 2010, the change in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a commonly used measure for
market concentration,5 inside each of these market categories represent the DOJ’s definition of a
substantial reduction in competition per the Clayton Antitrust Act. As we can see, policy
changed dramatically between 1968 and 1982. Indeed, under the 1968 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (HMGs), the DOJ did not even define unconcentrated markets – meaning that
consolidation in even thinly concentrated markets could be contested. Also, the definition of
moderately and highly concentrated markets was lower, the change in HHI inside these
categories that triggered contestation was also lower, and the wording on the likelihood of
contestation by the DOJ was much stronger.
In the 1982 and 2010 guidelines, the DOJ outline more grey area; some mergers could
“potentially” lead to DOJ contestation, those highlighted in Table 1, and other mergers were

4

64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2
HHI is the measure of the sum of the market shares of all producers in an industry: 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝜃𝑖 . 𝜃𝑖 is the
market share of the 𝑖th firm in the industry. N is the total number of firms. Market shares always sum to 100:
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝜃𝑖 = 100. Thus if 𝑁 = 1, i.e. there is a pure monopoly, the HHI of the industry is 10,000. In perfect
competition, where it is assumed that each firm has an infinitesimal market share, the HHI for any industry is zero.
5
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“likely” to lead to contestation, not outlined in Table 1. The degree of consolidation needed to
trigger the latter wording being significantly higher. Furthermore, the 1968 HMGs also had a
“trend toward concentration” category which essentially lowered the bar for DOJ contestation of
mergers and acquisitions in both moderately and highly concentrated markets when the market
share of the top four firms had increased by seven percentage points over the last five to ten
years. This category was eliminated from later HMGs.

Table 1: Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines
1968

1982

2010

Definition
of Category

Challenge
mergers

Definition of Challenge
Category
mergers

Definition
of Category

Challenge
mergers

Unconcentrated
Markets

--

--

HHI < 1000

HHI < 1500

--

Moderately
Concentrated

HHI < 14066

∆HHI ≥ 507

1000 ≤ HHI < ∆HHI ≥ 100
1800

1500 ≤ HHI
< 2500

∆HHI ≥ 100

Highly
Concentrated

HHI ≥ 1406

∆HHI ≥ 30

HHI ≥ 1800

HHI ≥ 2500

∆HHI ≥ 100

--

∆HHI ≥ 50

Source: Stelzner and Chaturvedi (2018) compilation of the Department of Justice’s Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-enforcement.
In 2010, the HMGs were again dramatically redefined. The definition of unconcentrated
markets was stretched from an HHI of less than 1000 to include HHIs of 1500, and highly
concentrated markets were defined to only start with HHIs greater than 2500 – up from 1800 in
the 1982 HMGs. Also, the change in HHI that “potentially” triggered contestation inside a
highly concentrated market was increased to 100, and the change in HHI that was “likely” to
lead to contestation was increased to 200.

6

The 1968 HMG were defined in terms of market shares. The DOJ defined moderately concentrated market in
1968 as where the largest four firms had a market share of less than 75 percent. The lower bound HHI equivalent
for such a market share is 1406 – where the top four firms each have a market share of 18.75 percent and the rest
of the firms in the market have an infinitesimally small share.
7
The 1968 HMG defined which mergers and acquisitions would be challenged inside each category based on size
of the acquiring and acquired firms. For example, if the acquiring firm had a market share of five percent or less,
then the DOJ would only challenge the merger if the acquired firm had a market share of greater than five percent.
The different thresholds for firms with different market shares led to different HHI thresholds for challenging
mergers and acquisitions inside moderate and highly concentrated markets.
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While the DOJ’s 1982 and 2010 definitions of a substantial reduction in competition
represent significant relaxations in antitrust administration, they underrepresent the degree to
which antitrust policy has been deregulated. Stelzner and Chaturvedi (2018) show that the
DOJ’s activity in blocking or modifying mergers and acquisitions through the courts represents
an even greater relaxation of antitrust administration. In Figures 1 through 3, we reproduce data
from Stelzner and Chaturvedi on yearly means and standard deviations and a five-year moving
average for pre, post, and change in HHI levels for all DOJ horizontal merger cases from 1968
through 2015, respectively. These values allow for visualization and estimation of the de facto
definition of permissible mergers. The five-year moving average and yearly means in each
figure represent two different ways to estimate the focus of DOJ antitrust policy and thus two
estimates of the acting definition of a substantial reduction in “competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.”

Figure 1: Pre-Merger HHI for DOJ Case Filings
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Source: Stelzner and Chaturvedi (2018) compilations using DOJ complaint filings and competitive
impact statements.
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Figure 2: Change in HHI from Merger for DOJ Case Filings
3000

2500

HHI

2000

1500

1000

500

0
1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

2013

Source: Stelzner and Chaturvedi (2018) compilations using DOJ complaint filings and competitive
impact statements.

Figure 3: Post-Merger HHI for DOJ Case Filings
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Source: Stelzner and Chaturvedi (2018) compilations using DOJ complaint filings and competitive
impact statements.
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By focusing on these mergers and acquisitions, the DOJ effectively demonstrates to the
private sector the threshold for contestation. Mergers and acquisitions below the threshold are
essentially deemed permissible and those above are essentially deemed illegal by the DOJ. As
we can see from Figures 1 through 3, in the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, the bar for DOJ
contestation of a merger or acquisition was much lower and more well defined. The antitrust
division at the Department of Justice contested mergers and acquisitions in even thinly
concentrated markets making clear to companies that mergers that would more severely reduce
competition were not permissible. The average change in HHI of mergers and acquisitions
contested through the courts by the DOJ was just over 100 between 1968 and 1974.
In the late 1970s, the DOJ seems to have already been moving in a more permissive
direction. The average change in HHI for mergers and acquisitions contested by the DOJ
increased to over 320 in the late 1970s and it continued to increase in the 1980s. Thus, it seems
that the change in the HMGs in 1982 only marked a formalization of change in de facto antitrust
policy already underway. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s the mean level of pre,
post, and change in HHI of DOJ horizontal merger cases moved upwards. In doing so, the
Department of Justice opened up more ground for permissible mergers and acquisitions. Thus,
like with the late 1970s, between 1982 and 2009, horizontal merger policy was made more
permissive even though the operating HMGs did not change during this period (Stelzner and
Chaturvedi, 2018).

Hospital consolidation and price change
Deregulation of antitrust policy led to an increase in mergers and acquisitions across the
economy, consolidation in healthcare being one part of this larger development. In this section
and the following two sections we look at change in concentration in hospitals, physician groups,
and health insurance, respectively. We then use the vast literature on change in concentration
and price movements specific to each of these subsectors of healthcare to identify the effect
consolidation had on healthcare prices.
As a result of the change in antitrust administration, hospitals consolidation increased.
Gaynor (2011) calculates HHIs for hospitals defining a market as a metropolitan statistical area
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(MSA) with a population of less than three million.8 He then calculates average hospital market
concentration for the United States as a whole weighing each MSA based on its population. The
results are displayed in Table 2. As we can see, hospital consolidation increased from the late
1980s through 2006 with the most dramatic changes taking place in the mid-1990s. Other
economists have found similar results. Vogt and Town (2006) calculate average HHI by region
in 1990 and 2003. These results are replicated in Table 3. As we can see, they arrive at a similar
conclusion – hospital concentration increased significantly. Indeed, from Vogt and Town’s data,
we can see that some regions, like the South, started from a higher level of concentration and
have seen more dramatic increase in concentration. For the nation as a whole, Vogt and Town
find that the market concentration has increased from an average HHI of 1,576 in 1990 to 2323
in 2003.
Table 2: Hospital Concentration in the United States, 1987 – 2006
Year

Mean HHI

Change

1987

2,340

1992

2,440

100

1997

2,983

543

2002

3,236

253

2006

3,261

25

Source: Gaynor (2011)

There is overwhelming evidence, summarized in Table 4, that increases in hospital
concentration lead to an increase in price.9 In each study listed in Table 4, we provide data on
the period and geography covered by the study and distil their final results. As we can see,
although different studies find different intensities of price change, all find that an increase in
hospital concentration leads to an increase in hospital prices. These studies use a number of
8

Gaynor (2011) leaves out MSAs with a population of more than three million because large cities my have
multiple hospital markets for their constituents inside the same MSA.
9
Indeed, this is exactly what we would expect from empirical studies of change in concentration and prices in
other industries and from economic theory. In terms of the latter, analysis of the Nash equilibrium price and
quantity in an N firm Cournot oligopoly shows that market power increases when concentration increases – even if
firms make production decisions in a decentralized manor. Market power is the ability of firms to influence the
market price of the goods they buy or sell.
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different methods from event study of price increase from a merger and acquisition in a single
market to broad statistical studies looking at the relationship between hospital prices and
concentration across time and county or MSA while controlling for other variables that might
affect price (like quality of healthcare provision, concentration of medical insurance companies
in the same area, the amount of Medicare and Medicaid patients, etc.). For example, Dafny
(2009) calculates the price effects on rival hospitals rather than the merging hospitals to address
selection problems and finds that nearby rival hospitals also raise prices when competitors
merge. The relationship between market concentration and prices is even robust across types of
hospitals (Keeler et al., 1999; Simpson and Shin, 1997; Dranove and Ludwick, 1999; Capps et
al., 2003; Gaynor and Vogt, 2003). For example, Keeler et al. (1999) find that both non-forprofit and for-profit hospital mergers lead to an increase in prices. Indeed, they find that non-forprofit mergers lead to higher prices and that the price increases resulting from a non-for-profit
merger are increasing over time.

Table 3: Changes in Hospital Concentration by Region, 1990 - 2003
Region

Mean HHI in 1990

Mean HHI in 2003

Change

East

1,285

1,982

697

Midwest

1,613

2,356

743

South

2,077

3,016

939

Southwest

1,820

2,494

674

West

1,694

2,242

548

Source: Vogt and Town (2006).

As can be seen from Table 4, the price effect from a given change in concentration can be
incredibly high. For example, Hass-Wilson and Garmon (2011) find that an increase in HHI of
384 points in a hospital market leads to a twenty percent increase in hospital prices. Likewise,
Tenn (2011) finds that a merger which resulted in a hospital with a market share of fifty percent
increased prices by 28 to 44 percent. While a few studies have found a much smaller price
effects, some of these findings might be statistically biased. For example, Cooper et al. (2015)
calculate the price effect from consolidation using dummy variables for monopoly, duopoly, and
triopoly. At the same time, as a proxy for quality of healthcare provision, they control for the
10 | P a g e

number of hospital beds. However, it is unclear how more beds represents better quality, and, it
is possible that this more flexible variable is picking up some of the price effect from their
rigidly constructed dummy variables for concentration. If this was the case, their value for the
price effect from an increase in concentration would be downwardly biased.

Table 4: Impact of Hospital Market Concentration Studies
STUDY

PERIOD OF
STUDY

CHANGE IN
CONCENTRATION

PRICE
CHANGE

1990-2003

∆HHI:384

+20%,

California 1999-2003

Post-merger combined market
share of 50%

+28.4%~44.2%

CAPPS &
DRANOVE
(2004)
COOPER,
CRAIG,
GAYNOR, &
VAN REENEN
(2015)

San
Diego

1997-2001

∆HHI:1000

+6.6%

US

2007-2011

∆HHI:833

+4.8%

∆HHI:2500

+6.4%

∆HHI:7500

+15.3%

DAFNY (2009)

US

∆HHI:1667

+40%

KEELER,
MELNICK, &
ZWANZIGER
(1999)

California 1986-1994

∆HHI:200

+4.5%

∆HHI:800

+7.3%

HAAS-WILSON
& GARMON
(2011)
TENN (2011)

AREA
OF
STUDY
Chicago

1989-1996

Source: Authors compilation of literature.

These studies have uncovered several other interesting results. For example, Gaynor et
al. (2015) find no significant relationship between clinical quality of services provided at
hospitals and prices in the United States. A report by the Office of the Attorney General of
Massachusetts (2010) finds that the large price variation inside the state is not correlated with
quality of health services. Likewise, a report by Pennsylvania HealthCare Cost Containment
Council (2007) finds the same for the price and quality of heart surgery in Pennsylvania. While
other studies have found mixed results in the connection between price and quality (for example,
see Cooper et al. (2015)), these findings show, like with the divergent national trends in
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healthcare costs and outcomes, that higher quality is not the central reason for variation in
hospital prices.

Physician consolidation and price change
While there is less data, that available points to similar increases in concentration for
physician groups. For example, Liebhaber and Grossman (2007) present data, depicted in Table
5, on the percentage of physicians practicing in groups of different sizes between 1996 and 2005
in the United States. As we can see, although solo or two- physician practices are still the most
common, such practices have decreased in prominence between 1996 and 2005. Likewise,
practices with between three and five physicians have also decreased in prominence with only
9.8 percent of all physicians in such practices in 2005. On the other hand, larger physician
groups have increased in prominence. The percent of physicians in practices that contain
between six and fifty physicians increased from 13.1 percent in 1996 and 1997 to 17.6 percent in
the mid-2000s. And physician in practices with more than fifty members have increased from
2.9 percent to 4.2 percent over the same period. Indeed, at present physician groups seem to be
very concentration. For example, Schneider et al. (2007) calculate the concentration of physician
groups across counties in California in 2001. They find a third of the counties in California have
physician group markets with an HHI between 1800 and 3600 and a half have an HHI of greater
than 3600 with an average county HHI for physician organizations of 4,430.
Table 5: Physicians groups by size, 1996 – 2005
PHYSICIANS IN
1996 – 1997
PRACTICE
1–2
40.7%

1998 – 1999

2000 – 2001

2004 – 2005

37.4%

35.2%

32.4%

3–5

12.2%

9.6%

11.7%

9.8%

6 – 50

13.1%

14.2%

15.8%

17.6%

> 50

2.9%

3.5%

2.7%

4.2%

Source: Libhaber and Grossman (2007).

Like with hospital concentration, a number of studies have shown that an increase in
concentration in physician group markets results in an increase in price for physician services.
To get an idea of the literature, in Table 6, we summarizes serval of the studies including
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information on geography and period of study and distill the final results from each. As we can
see, while there is variation in the price effect, each finds a positive relation between change in
concentration and price in the physician group markets.
Table 6: Impact of Physician Market Concentration on Prices Studies
STUDY
SCHNEIDER
ET AL. (2007)
BAKER ET
AL. (2014)
DUNN AND
SHAPIRO
(2014)

AREA OF
STUDY
California

PERIOD OF
STUDY
2001

CHANGE IN
CONCENTRATION
∆HHI: 1%

PRICE CHANGE

United States

2003 – 2010

∆HHI:2606

+8.3 to 16.1 %

United States

2005 – 2008

∆HHI: 10%

+0.5 to 1%

+1 to 4 %

Source: Authors compilation of literature.

Insurance consolidation and price change
Like with hospital and physician group markets, medical insurance has also seen an
increase in concentration. For example, Dafny (2015) calculates the national market share of the
top five medical insurers from 2006 through 2014. The results are displayed in Figure 4. As we
can see, even if we define insurance markets nationally, there is significant concentration, and
concentration is increasing. However, as pointed out by Dafny, these figures underestimate the
degree of insurance concentration because most medical insurance markets are local or regional.
To look at medical insurance concentration from another angle, Dafny (2010) calculates
market concentration for medical insurance for fully insured employees at large companies in the
United States between 1998 and 2009. The results are displayed in Table 7. As we can see, this
series shows both that market concentration has been increasing over a longer period and that
concentration is higher when we more accurately define the market. Indeed, market
concentration for medical insurance for fully insured employees at large companies increased
from an HHI of 2,984 in 1998 – an already high degree of concentration – to 4,126 in 2009 – a
value representing something very close to a duopoly for medical insurances markets in the
United States.10

10

This is essentially twice as high as national figures. For example, the market share of the top five firms depicted
in Figure 4 would equal a lower bound HHI of 1708.
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Figure 4: Estimated National Market Shares of the Top Five Medical Insurers, 2006 – 2014
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Source: Dafny (2015).

Table 7: Fully Insured, Large Employer Insurance Market Concentration, 1998 - 2009
Year

Mean HHI

Change in HHI

1998

2,984

--

1999

2,835

-149

2000

3,092

+257

2001

3,006

-86

2002

3,158

+152

2003

3,432

+274

2004

3,706

+274

2005

3,951

+245

2006

4,072

+121

2007

4,056

-16

2008

4,201

+145

2009

4,126

-75

Source: Dafny (2010).
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Increased concentration in medical insurance markets leads to a decrease in prices paid
to medical providers (Cooper et al., 2015; Moriya et al., 2010; Dafny et al., 2011 and 2015; Kate
and Ho, 2017). For example, Dafny et al. (2011) shows that a merger in the insurance market
reduces physician earning growth by three percent. Kate and Ho (2017) show that after two
insurance companies combined, hospital prices fell as the remaining insurers exercised increased
monopsony power, and Moriya et al. (2010) show that an increase in HHI of 1000 reduces
purchase prices by 8.4 percent, and an increase in HHI of 800 decreases hospital prices by 6.7
percent.
However, these cost savings do not translate into a reduction in premiums paid by
consumers. For example, Kate and Ho (2017) show that increases in medical insurance
premiums accompany increases in consolidation of medical insurance – even when insurance
companies decrease the prices they paid to medical providers. Dafny et al. (2011) show that an
increase in HHI of 698 in medical insurance markets leads to a seven percent increase in
premiums. Robinson (2004) shows that increased concentration in medical insurance led to a
decrease in the medical cost ratio – medical cost divided by premium revenues – from 85.1 to
82.1 percent. Finally, Guardado et al. (2013) found that premiums increased by 13.7 percent
when Sierra Health and UnitedHealth merged in Nevada. Thus, like with hospital and physician
group markets, increase in concentration in medical insurance markets hurts the ultimate
consumers of health services. To some degree recent changes in law have put an upper limit on
medical insurers’ ability to increase premiums even in the face of decreasing cost of medical
care. Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, insurers are required to spend at least 80 percent of
their premiums on medical care. However, both Obama and Trump granted some waivers
allowing for certain insurers to spend less than the required 80 percent.
Indeed, we can see the price setting power of private medical insurance agencies by
looking at the difference between the user cost of health insurance for private insurance and for
Medicare and Medicaid. The user cost of health insurance is the net costs of health insurance –
total revenue from premiums minus total amount paid out in claims – divided by the total claims
paid. In Figure 5, we use national health expenditure data to show the user cost of medical
insurance for private insurance and Medicare and Medicaid. Although the user cost of public
insurance is increasing, the cost of private insurance is significantly higher – around 100 percent
higher at present. To some degree this under represents the benefits insurance companies accrue
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from market power. For example, Medicare Advantage, which is part of Medicare, is privately
provided and has seen significant increases in concentration (Dafny, 2015). Also, Starc (2010)
shows that the Medigap market for insurance is highly concentrated – the top two and top four
firms control 70 and 83 percent of the national market, respectively. Starc finds that the large
variation in Medigap prices are positively correlated with concentration. Thus, some of the
recent increase in the user cost of Medicare, depicted in Figure 5, is most likely a result of
increased market power also.

Figure 5: The User Cost of Private and Public Health Insurance
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COST/TOTAL CLAIMS PAID)
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Source: Authors calculations from nation health expenditure data.

Patent laws for Pharmaceuticals and price change
During the same period that antitrust administration was deregulated, patent law was
made more stringent. While this might seem contradictory in terms of underlying political
ideology, more stringent patent laws have the same effect as deregulating antitrust law; they
increase the market power of medical providers, in this case pharmaceutical and medical
instrument companies, allowing them to dramatically increase prices.
The foundation of patent law in the United States is written into Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution. However, there have been many legislative, adjudicative, and administrative
changes over the years. During the mid-twentieth century, like with treatment of merger and
acquisitions, the federal government and the courts abrogated certain patent rights to increase the
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dissemination of technology throughout the economy. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s, the
federal government aggressively pushed private companies to license patents more liberally –
affecting between 40,000 and 50,000 patents. While at a reduced pace, in the 1960s and into the
1970s, the federal government continued to pursue compulsory licensing of patents when
companies were seen to restrain trade (Scherer, 2009).
Starting in the late 1970s and solidifying in the 1980s, the federal government and the
courts changed direction. Much of the change in patent law flowed from Congress. For
example, reversing previous policy that government held title to inventions from contracts with
the private sector and ending two decades of debate, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave research
entities control of patents derived from work carried out on government contracts. This allowed
institutions and private companies to reap huge private benefits through public giveaways.
While the government maintained the ability to exercise “march-in” rights if unsatisfied with the
use of the patent. Scherer (2009) reports that no government agency had utilized such a
provision as of 2005, even when companies dramatically increased price above costs at the
expense of the greater public good. This should not have been much of a surprise. Responding
to criticism of the Bayh-Dole Act, its congressional sponsors, Birch Bayh and Bob Dole, argued
that “march-in” rights are not triggered by a high price of patented good or by profits of the
company holding the patent but only “when the private industry collaborator has not successfully
commercialized the invention as a product.”11
In 1982, Congress moved patent cases from appellate court panels to the newly created
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) which proved to be much
friendlier in a number of ways to patent holders than the previous setup (Scherer, 2009). First,
while the appellate court had rejected around two thirds of patents on grounds of validity, CAFC
only reject one third of cases. This figure underrepresents the change in leaning under CAFC,
because increased friendliness to patent holders greatly increased case load and comparatively
reduced case quality (Allison and Lemley, 1998). Second, CAFC was more willing than the
appellate courts to utilize injunctions to stop patent infringement, and third, CAFC significantly
changed assessment of damages from infringement of patent rights to the benefit of the patent
holder – leading to much larger assessed damages (Quillen Jr, 2006).

11

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/04/11/our-law-helps-patients-get-new-drugssooner/d814d22a-6e63-4f06-8da3-d9698552fa24/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.879b21295f36
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The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 increased the duration of patents from 10 to 13 years on
average, postprocessing time, to 17 years extending the amount of time a firm could legally
exclude competition and thus hold prices above market values. In 1995, to comply with the
Trade Relations Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Congress again extended the
duration of patents from 17 to 20 years from the time of filling and made it easier to extend the
duration of a patent if process time took longer than average (Baker, 2016).
Apart from the legislative changes highlighted above, there were other developments in
patent law that were purely administrative. For example, in the 1970s, the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice was critical of and likely to contest patent licensing agreements that
stipulated minimum prices. This view immediately came under criticism in the 1980s, and in
1995, the DOJ and the FTC issued new guidelines that were much more permissive to minimum
prices in patent licensing (Scherer, 2009).

PERCENT

Figure 6: Generic Price of Drug as a Percentage of Brand Price
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All these changes increased the market power of patent holders allowing them to increase
price above costs without worrying about losing customers to competition. Indeed, Kesselheim
et al. (2016) explain that the most important factor in the determination of prescription drug
prices in the United States is the market exclusivity given to patent holders. Caves, Whinston,
and Hurwitz (1991) show that the price of pharmaceutical drugs dramatically moved away from
the cost of labor and material inputs starting in 1982 – when patent law was first being remade.
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And the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (2015) show that drug prices decrease
dramatically when a patent expires and generic competitors are allowed to enter the market. In
Figure 6, we reproduce FDA findings. The horizontal axis shows the number of generic
competitors and the vertical axis shows the price as a percentage of its value when under patent.
As we can see, the entrance of 17 or more competitors can drive prices below ten percent of the
price when the drug was protected by a patent. Indeed, this result is not unexpected; it mimics
theoretical modeling of firm entrance in an N-firm Cournot oligopoly.
Thus, with patent support, prescription drug prices can be held very high. For example,
after large government support in the synthesizing and clinical trial stages, the company which
obtained “method of use” patents for the first effective antiretroviral for acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), sold the drug for around five times more than the
production costs (Scherer, 2009). Likewise, because of the more stringent patent protection in
the United States and thus greater market power of pharmaceutical companies, drugs in the
United States are much more expensive to their equivalents abroad. For example, the drug used
to treat hepatitis C, Sovaldi, has a list price in the United States of $84,000 for three months
treatment while a high-quality generic in India is available for around $300 to $500 (Gokhale,
2015). In general, the average percentage saved by an American from purchasing commonly
used prescription drugs in Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France would be 43, 57, 65,
and 67 percent, respectively, in 2017 (Miller, 2018). Restating this same information in terms of
the windfall prices for pharmaceutical companies, Baker (2016) calculates that rents on
prescription drugs grew from 0.1 percent of GDP in 1980 to 1.8 and 2.1 percent in 2018.

Estimating the Cost of Big Medicine
Thus, there has been dramatic changes in antitrust and patent law which are central for
understanding the increase in cost of healthcare. In this section, we bring all this information
together and calculate the amount Americans have overpaid for private healthcare between 1980
and 2006 because of price movements stemming from increased market power of hospitals,
physician groups, medical insurance carriers, and pharmaceutical companies. To do this, we set
up a basic growth accounting framework to compute a counterfactual for what price movements
would have been if antitrust and patent laws had not seen the changes highlighted above. The
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rent – the degree to which Americans have overpaid – is the difference between the actual series
and the counterfactual.
The increase in healthcare expenditure over the last forty years is a result of both price
and non-price factors. Let’s say national health expenditure for one subsector, 𝜑𝑖 , equals price
of healthcare times quantity consumed, 𝑃𝑖 𝑄𝑖 . The subscript 𝑖 denotes the subsector of healthcare
(hospital, physician group, medical insurance, and prescription drugs for the analysis here).
Non-price factors include the increase in consumption from increased intensity per capita and
from a growing population. Price factors include increases in price from increased market power
and from other factors, like a change in the quality of a good or inflation. For our purposes, let’s
say that the price, 𝑃𝑖 , is an additive function of price movements from change in market
power, 𝑔𝑖 (𝑡), and from other factors, ℎ𝑖 (𝑡); 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 (𝑡) + ℎ𝑖 (𝑡). If we take the derivative of
national health expenditures by sector and divide both sides of the equation by 𝜑𝑖 , we get the
percent change in national health expenditures per unit of time:
𝜕𝑔𝑖 𝜕ℎ𝑖
+
𝜕𝑡 + 𝑄̂
𝜑̂𝑖 = 𝜕𝑡
𝑖
𝑃

𝑄̂𝑖 is the rate of change of quantity – i.e. the rate of change of non-price factors.
rate of change of price from change in market power,

𝜕𝑔𝑖
𝜕𝑡

𝑃

𝜕𝑔𝑖 𝜕ℎ𝑖
+
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑡

𝑃

, and from other price factors,

is the
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑡

𝑃

.

Using this basic framework, we can create a counterfactual for the rate of change of healthcare
expenditure by subsector by subtracting out the increase in price from increased market power.
𝜑̂ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝜑̂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑃̂↑𝑀𝑃
Data on the actual rate of change in healthcare expenditures by sector, 𝜑̂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 , comes
from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.12 Data on the increase in price from
change in market power, 𝑃̂↑𝑀𝑃 , comes from imputing a series using the studies on the price

12

https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/index.html.
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effects highlighted above and from data on actual change in concentration. For hospital
expenditure, we use the Gaynor’s (2011) national concentration series, replicated in Table 2. For
the price effect of change in concentration, we use both the median and high values from the
studies surveyed in Table 4 for a lower bound and upper bound calculation, respectively. For
physician group expenditure, we use Schneider et al. (2007). For medical insurance
concentration, we compute net healthcare expenditure using the high and mean public user cost
over the period as the lower and upper bound, respectively. The net health insurance expenditure
is calculated as a percent of the newly imputed cost of hospital and physician group services and
prescription drugs. Because of lack of data in all these series, we take the Department of
Justice’s maximum for a moderately concentrated market from the 1962 HMGs, an HHI of 1405,
to define concentration in 1980. For prescription drugs, we use the rate of change of price from
the Canadian prescription drug index as the counterfactual price change series.
Using actual spending in 1980 as the starting point and the counterfactual series on the
rate of change of expenditure if patent and antitrust laws had not changed, we calculate the
nominal and real counterfactual series for national health expenditure by subsector. In Figures 7
through 10, we display these estimates, based off the lower bound price effects, for hospitals,
physician groups, net insurance, and prescription drugs in real 2016 dollars. The solid blue line
in each represents actual, national, private health expenditure in the respective subsector. The
dotted blue line represents what national, private health spending would have been if the United
States had not seen the changes in antitrust and patent laws highlighted above.
As we can see, without the changes in law and the resulting changes in price, private
national health expenditures would have been much less. Indeed, the lower bound estimate for
the total rent accrued to hospitals, physician groups, medical insurance carriers, and prescription
drugs companies between 1980 and 2006 is equal to $3.4 trillion in 2016 dollars – equivalent to
18.06 percent of GDP in 2016. The upper bound estimate for the total rent, which utilizes the
higher estimated price effects from the series surveyed above, is $5.7 trillion in 2016 dollars –
equivalent to 30.9 percent of GDP in 2016.
The total rent in health is similar in magnitude to the total rent in finance. Epstein and
Montecino (2016) calculate that between 1980 and 2005 the total rent in finance in the form of
excess wages and profits was between $3.7 and $4.3 trillion in 2016 dollars. The similarities
with finance do not end there. The centrality of deregulation of finance to make possible this
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multi-trillion-dollar rent is eerily similar to the deregulation of antitrust and the increase in
regulation of patent law which made increasingly large rents possible in healthcare.
Figure 7: National, Private Hospital Expenditure – Actual and Counterfactual
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Figure 8: National, Private Physician Expenditure – Actual and Counterfactual
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Figure 9: National, Private Medical Insurance Expenditure – Actual and Counterfactual
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Figure 10: National, Private Prescription Drug Expenditure – Actual and Counterfactual
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While these figures are significant, even the upper bound calculations for the rent in
healthcare most likely underestimates total rents for several reasons. First, we have not
calculated rents in all subcategories of healthcare (for example in durable and nondurable
medical equipment, in nursing care, in the public provisions of medical care, etc.) In terms of
the former, medical equipment has also benefited from the change in antitrust and patent laws.
In terms of the latter, the private elements of Medicare – like Medigap and Medicare Advantage
– have also seen increases in concentration and corresponding increases in price. Second, the
price effects highlighted above do not include change in quality from increased concentration – a
secondary way to utilize market power. Indeed, many studies have found a negative relationship
between concentration and quality. For example, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and
Geppert (2005) find that increased market concentration significantly increases mortality. Third,
the figures above do not include the negative effects from misallocation of resources. For
example, the huge rents to be earned through consolidation or through winning a patent
incentivize medical providers to dedicate significant resources to lawyers to usher patent cases
through the courts and to probe the many exceptions to the Department of Justice’s Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. These investments represent resources diverted from other activities that
might be more beneficial to society.
Coming back to the initial motivating question: why does the United States spend so
much on healthcare as a percentage of GDP compared to other countries while many health
outcomes for Americans are comparatively worse? We have seen here that it is largely because
we have created a system that is great for healthcare providers but at the expensive of the greater
society. Indeed, these calculations go a long way in understanding the difference in healthcare
expenditures in the United States compared to other advanced industrialized countries. For
example, in the 1990s and 2000s, national health expenditure would have been between two and
three percentage points of GDP less per year if we had not remade antitrust and patent laws and
the quantity of health services consumed stayed the same. In Figure 11, we display data on total
healthcare spending by country as a percentage of GDP between 1970 and 2006. The solid blue
series is the United States, and the dotted blue series is what healthcare spending would have
been if antitrust and patent laws didn’t change.
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Figure 11: Total Healthcare Spending as a Percentage of GDP
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As we can see, the counterfactual national health expenditure series represents a
significant decrease in relative health expenditure. While the United States would still have been
spending more on healthcare as a percentage of GDP than other developed countries, the relative
difference would have been much less. For example, the difference between total health
expenditure in the United States and Germany and France in 2006 would have been on the order
of one percentage point of GDP as opposed to 4.5 percentage points – definitely a big cost for
our embrace of big medicine.
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